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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
order and the desire for freedom is indispensable to a democratic society.
Ultimately, triumph must not be by the evangelists of inflexible logic, the
scope of which embraces only total interdiction of firearms, nor by those
who subscribe to unfettered freedom, for in the final analysis they may well
be the protagonists of near anarchy; rather, it must be by those who are
willing to wean the extremes of their evils and secure the amalgamation of
their virtues.
Bruce Petesch
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-AN EVALUATION OF A
NEW PROPOSAL
The cost of automobile casualty insurance has consistently increased
throughout the United States. In 1966 alone, insurance premiums rose in
all but eighteen states,' and higher premiums are predictable as insurance
companies contend that further increases will be needed to keep pace with
their rising operation costs. 2 Insurers contend that the present liability sys-
tem is marred by a significant number of unwarranted claims, which is a
major contributor to the blacklog of cases pending in our courts and a pri-
mary cause of increased insurance premiums.
With this increase in the number of claims, rising insurance premiums,
and mounting court congestion, two law professors, Robert Keeton of
Harvard Law School and Jeffrey O'Connell of the University of Illinois, be-
lieve that the present system for the recovery of damages incurred in an
automobile accident is ripe for reform. Keeton and O'Connell have presented
a plan of "basic protection for automobile accident victims," which is in-
tended to alleviate many of the problems of the present system.3 The purpose
of their plan is to eliminate litigation for recovery of bodily injuries in an
automobile accident involving less than five thousand dollars in pain and
suffering or less than ten thousand dollars in total economic loss. The in-
jured would be compensated by his own insurer for economic loss regard-
less of fault. The "basic protection" plan was introduced before the Seventy-
Fifth Illinois General Assembly as House Bill 1548. Although the proposal
was not enacted in Illinois, being tabled by the House of Representatives,
Professors Keeton and O'Connell anticipate having their plan introduced in
other state legislatures.
1 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 17, 1967 at 68.
2Id.
8 KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcnm-A BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
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Essential to a meaningful analysis of how the plan will change the present
system is an understanding of some of the fundamental concepts. Under the
plan, net economic loss is defined as: "[A] ccrued economic detriment from
accidental injury, consisting of allowable expenses and work loss. . . . Pain,
suffering and inconveniences are not losses."14 Net loss is defined as: "Loss
less subtractable benefits received from sources other than basic and added
protection insurance."5 This indicates that where the injured party sustains
losses of four thousand dollars in pain and suffering and two thousand dollars
in net economic loss, he will receive reparation of only two thousand dollars
because no remedy is provided for pain and suffering under the plan. In
such a situation, no suit for tortious conduct would be permitted. The
reparation would be available, under the plan, only from one's own insurer.
Their plan provides reparation, regardless of fault, in automobile accident
cases which involve claims for less than five thousand dollars in pain and
suffering, or less than ten thousand dollars in total net loss per person. When
these prerequisites are satisfied, the injured party is compensated by his
own insurance company for the net economic loss sustained, but no recovery
is provided for pain and suffering under "basic protection." Should the plan
be enacted, the injured party would not have a remedy in tort for claims
under five thousand dollars in pain and suffering or under ten thousand
dollars in total net loss. When either of these limits is exceeded, the injured
party must proceed under the present tort liability system.
The "basic protection" plan is in direct opposition to the established rule
that a tortfeasor compensates the injured for damages resulting from his
wrongful acts. This note will be devoted to examining the effect of the "basic
protection" plan in relation to the problems of the present tort liability sys-
tem, in order to determine whether legislative enactment is desirable.
In order for the "basic protection" plan to function properly, compulsory
insurance must be enacted. Without such legislation "basic protection" and
the present tort liability system would be in direct competition.6 Innocent
victims would prefer to litigate their claims under the present system since
they could receive compensation for pain and suffering, and recovery would
not depend upon whether the victim has insurance. Tortfeasors would prefer
"basic protection" as they would receive compensation regardless of fault.
Thus, it is necessary to evaluate compulsory insurance laws to determine the
value of these laws and how they can effect the plan. At present only Massa-
chusetts, North Carolina and New York have enacted compulsory insurance
4Ill. Laws, 75th Gen. Ass. (1967), H.B. 1548, § 1-9, tabled May 20, 1967 (hereinafter
cited as Ill. H.B. 1548).
5111. H.B. 1548, § 1-10.
6 Supra note 3.
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legislation; all three states have had only limited success. 7 A prime reason
for this limited success is the difficulty of enforcing such laws.
In order to enforce compulsory insurance in these states, the owner of a
vehicle is required to obtained a certificate of insurance before vehicle
license plates can be issued to him. Such a system would seem to eliminate
uninsured motorists. However, in New York alone, official estimates show
that there are approximately 226,000 uninsured motorists.8 The failure of
compulsory insurance is exemplified by the fact that all three states require
by law that uninsured motorist insurance be offered to provide compensation
to persons injured by uninsured motorists. 9 One reason advanced for this
failure is that after vehicle license plates are issued, the owner cancels his
insurance, thus avoiding compulsory insurance. It is also interesting that
in New York State an insured motorist pays premiums of four dollars per
year for uninsured motorist insurance which is as high as the national aver-
age.10 This again indicates that compulsory insurance has not been successful.
The declaration of purpose in New York State's uninsured motorist cover-
age statute states that compulsory insurance laws have failed to provide
adequate recompense to the injured:
The legislature finds and declares that the motor vehicle financial security act
[compulsory insurance] . . . fails to accomplish its full purpose of securing to
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents recompense for the injury and finan-
cial loss inflicted upon them."
Ever since these three states have enacted compulsory insurance laws, they
have experienced more claims than ever before. A special legislative com-
mission in Massachusetts which reviewed the state's compulsory automobile
insurance system found, as a possible answer for the increase in claims,
that the system induces unwarranted claims:
In view of the claim frequencies being higher in this Commonwealth than in
any other state in the Nation, there must of necessity be a serious question as to
whether or not a substantial number of these claims are unwarranted, exaggerated.
or in some instances are even fraudulent. This claim consciousness unquestionably
results from compelling all motorists to carry liability insurance on their vehicles
There can be no question but that the inducement to file a claim on the slightest
7 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (1958) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1958) ; N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAWS § 312 (McKinney 1965); Article published by the National Association
of Independent Insurers, Story of Failure, on file in the DePaul Law Review offices.
S Martin and Sefton, Cheats Run Wild Against Auto Insurance Law, New York Daily
News, Dec. 8, 1966.
9 Supra note 7.
10 Supra note 8.
"1 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWS § 600 (McKinney 1965).
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provocation, or even on no grounds at all, is inherent under a compulsory insur-
ance system.12
Motorists in Massachusetts and New York pay the highest insurance rates
in the country, which are twice the national average.'3 Also state administra-
tion of compulsory insurance is very costly. In New York State, it has been
estimated that it takes one thousand or more state employees to handle the
compulsory program and the Motor Vehicle Department spends in excess of
3.5 million dollars a year to administer the law.' 4
Without improvement in the enforcement of compulsory insurance, the
success of "basic protection" appears to be doubtful. One possible sugges-
tion to eliminate many of the uninsured motorists would be to charge a
penalty for cancellation of insurance or not allow cancellation before the
expiration of the policy by the insured. Before any state can adopt a "basic
protection" plan, some workable compulsory insurance enforcement plan must
be found.
One of the major contributors to the blacklog of cases pending in our
courts is claims resulting from automobile accidents. In Illinois, a backlog
exists in many of the counties, with Cook County having a waiting period
of over five years.' 5 Keeton and O'Connell hope that "basic protection" will
significantly reduce the mounting backlog of cases pending in our courts by
disposing of litigation for bodily injury from automobile accidents involving
less than five thousand dollars in pain and suffering, or less than ten thousand
dollars in total economic loss. However, careful examination of the plan re-
veals it will not eliminate a substantial number of cases involving automobile
accidents and therefore will not significantly reduce court congestion.
By limiting the scope of "basic protection" to recovery of damages for
bodily injury, the plan does not eliminate litigation for property losses in-
curred which have represented sixty-eight percent of all accident claims
according to a Michigan survey.' 6 All injuries involving more than five
thousand dollars in pain and suffering or more than ten thousand dollars
in total economic loss will still require litigation. Also, suits for wrongful
death will still require litigation.
The "basic protection" plan creates new legal questions requiring litiga-
12 MASS. S. REP. No. 466 (1959).
13Supra note 7.
14Supra note 7.
15 In the Law Division the waiting period is 60.2 months. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, 13TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF STATE COURT CALENDARS (1965); Comment,
Additur: Procedural Boon or Constitutional Calamity, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 175 (1967).
16 Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in The Automobile Jury Impasse, 52
A.B.A.J. 533 (1966).
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tion, besides not eliminating many of the present areas of litigation. As
with any newly proposed law, there are areas which can only be interpreted
through court decision, and this proposal is no exception. For example, the
plan allows for "reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary prod-
ucts, services and accommodations."' 17 However, the plan establishes no defini-
tion of reasonableness except for the cost of hospital rooms. Another section
of the plan allows for reasonable attorney's fees as the insurer pays half
the fees of the claimant's attorney.' The legal question presented is who
will determine the reasonableness of fees: the legal profession, the insurers,
or the courts? Another question is presented where an injured party brings
suit and the jury returns a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but awards
damages of less than ten thousand dollars: who pays the damages-the de-
fendant or the plaintiff's insurance company? The litigation required to
interpret these and other areas of the proposed law will add to, rather than
alleviate court congestion.
In addition, there is a possibility of increasingly unwarranted and inflated
claims. 19 Under "basic protection" no compensation is provided for pain and
suffering. However, when the claims involve more than five thousand dollars
in pain and suffering the innocent victim may litigate to recover damages
for pain and suffering in excess of the limitation imposed by the plan. This
limitation will act as an incentive for the innocent victim to inflate his
claim so as to receive compensation for pain and suffering through the present
tort liability system.2 0 Payments by the injured's own insurance company
will not eliminate the desire of an innocent victim to sue for such compen-
sation.21 To eliminate the incentive to inflate claims created under the "basic
protection" plan, a possible solution would be to provide scheduled benefits
depending on the particular type of injury for pain and suffering in addition
to reparation for economic loss. The reason "basic protection" does not
provide reparation for pain and suffering is that only a jury can determine
the amount of pain and suffering. However, under the proposed modification
there is no need for a jury determination. The idea of scheduled benefits is
similar to Workmen's Compensation and a plan established in Saskatchewan,
Canada.
22
17111. H.B. 1548, § 1-9(a) provides: "In no event will allowable expenses within basic
protection coverage include a charge for a hospital room in excess of a reasonable and
customary charge for semiprivate accommodations ....
18 Ill. H.B. 1548, § 3-9.
19 Address by Paul F. Laughlin, New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting, in
THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Mar. 17, 1967, at 36.
20 Id.
21 Address by Gerald E. Myers, Independent Insurance Agents of Illinois Annual Meet-
ing, in TnE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Nov. 11, 1966, at 34.
22 Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 51 (Sask. 1964). For a complete
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Further, "basic protection" abolishes the collateral source rule. This rule
states that a defendant cannot mitigate his damages by showing that other
benefits were received by the injured.2 3 The collateral source rule is followed
in all federal and state courts except Alabama. 24 The rule is widely
accepted as courts feel it is better to give the injured a windfall of addi-
tional recovery than to give it to the tortfeasor.23 By allowing only net re-
covery of economic loss, the "basic protection" plan abolishes the collateral
source rule, again increasing the possibility of inflated claims. According to
the Health Insurance Institute, seventy-eight percent of the civilian popula-
tion had some form of health insurance protection in 1963.26 This means
that a large percentage of victims will receive reduced benefits and possibly
no benefits under "basic protection," and therefore, they would have little
to lose by engaging in litigation.27 This potential increase in unwarranted
claims would further add to the backlog of cases pending in our courts.
Although it appears that the "basic protection" plan will not substantially
alleviate the court's congestion, it will allow for earlier payments to the
injured. This is one of the better points of the plan as earlier payments will
be a great benefit to the injured victim. It is during the pending litigation
that the claimant is most often placed in financial difficulty.28 The plan
provides that payments are due within thirty days after the insurer receives
reasonable proof of loss. It also provides for interest of six percent per annum
on overdue payments. The objective of earlier payment to the injured repre-
sents one of the plan's improvements over the present tort liability system.
"Basic protection" also strives to improve the present system by reducing
the carrier's cost. A Michigan study showed that for each dollar paid out
by insurers in claims, 1.2 dollars must be spent for administration fees.29
The cost under a direct payment system would be far less. Professors Keeton
and O'Connell estimate the costs under "basic protection" to be fifteen to
twenty-five percent lower than the costs of the present system.30 However,
this does not mean that the insured would necessarily save that much in
discussion see Grad, Recent Development in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
COLUm. L. REV. 300 (1950).
23 Lambert, The Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 516 INS. L.J. 531 (1966).
2 4 Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 516 INs. L.J. 545 (1966).
25 Id.
26 Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-O'Connell
Proposal, 52 A.BA.J. 639 (1966).
2 7 Id.
2 8 Supra note 16.
29 Id.
30 Keeton, A Basic Protection Insurance for Claims of Traffic Victims, 2 HARv. J. LEGIs.
41 (1965).
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premiums. By being open to liability for damages in excess of the limitations
of "basic protection" the prudent insured will carry additional coverage
which according to actuaries would partially eliminate the savings provided
under the plan.3 1
Lower costs to the carrier are also achieved by substantially reducing the
benefits paid to each victim. Examples of these reduced benefits are as
follows: no recovery is provided for pain, suffering, and inconvenience;
benefits are reduced by reparation from other sources; and no recovery is
allowed for the first one hundred dollars of economic loss.82 Lower costs are
again achieved by minimizing the attorney's fees expended by the insurer in
defending the suit and by the injured in bringing the suit to court.
It appears that lower costs will be achieved under "basic protection,"
but the plan provides a minimum deterrence for reducing the number of claims
The system of merit rating which provides careful drivers lower premiums
can no longer be used under "basic protection," for the premiums are the
same for careful and careless drivers. Frequently, only one of the drivers
is at fault, but under the "basic protection" plan both the faulty and the
faultless driver will be penalized.83 Therefore, it can be said that the plan
minimizes the incentive for good driving by not offering any benefits to the
responsible drivers or detriment to the careless ones.34
The public sanctions lower costs but fewer claims. With these two com-
peting factors, it is interesting to try to predict the public's reaction to the
"basic protection" plan. Although no survey has been taken concerning the
plan, certain other factors can be used to indicate public reaction. One such
factor is evident within the plan itself. It appears as if the authors felt the
public would not be receptive to a proposal that entirely abolished the
common law action of negligence in automobile accidents involving bodily
injury. By the limitations of five thousand dollars for pain and suffering,
and ten thousand dollars for total loss, the authors retained the negligence
action in cases involving claims over these limitations.3 5
Public reaction is partially revealed by a test conducted by Nationwide
81 Ghiarde, DRI Official Against Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection for Traffic Victims,
TnE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, June 23, 1967.
82 Ill. H.B. 1548 § 2-3(a) provides: "The greater of the following amounts otherwise
qualifying for reimbursement under this insurance is to be excluded in calculating benefits
to each claimant arising from one accident: (i) the first $100.00 of net loss or (ii) 10%
of all work loss."
83 Supra note 21.
34 Open letter by Defense Research Institute to all corporation presidents, in T3E
NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Jan. 20, 1967, at 36.
85 Knepper, Alimony for Traffic Victim, 15 DuENSE L.J. 513 (1966).
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Insurance Company from 1959 through 1965. Nationwide instituted a pro-
gram whereby third parties involved in accidents with Nationwide drivers
were permitted to choose between collecting benefits regardless of fault or
proceeding under the tort liability system. Such a program is similar to the
"basic protection" plan. Out of approximately forty-one thousand claims
under Nationwide's program, only 8,863 claimants chose the alternative of
benefits regardless of proving fault.3 6 This limited test by Nationwide seems
to indicate that the public favors litigation under the present tort liability
system as compared to a plan that is very similar to "basic protection."
Unfavorable public opinion greatly reduces the possibility of the "basic
protection" plan being enacted in Illinois or other states.
"Basic protection" changes the essential principle of the tort liability
system by establishing the principle that both the victim and tortfeasor
will receive reparation for their losses. The advocates of the tort liability
system feel that a wrongdoer should not be compensated for the injuries he
sustains. They justify this by holding each man responsible for his own
fault.3 7 On the other hand, Professors Keeton and O'Connell and other com-
pensationists feel that when one's life may be catastrophically transformed,
society, rather than the individual, should bear the loss.
The compensationists advance several reasons for reparation to all vic-
tims regardless of fault. First, the sanctions imposed on the tortfeasor for
negligence are not commensurate to the wrong.3 8 The tortfeasor who is also
injured receives no reparation and as a result suffers extreme financial hard-
ship because of being negligent. Also, determination of fault is merely for a
legal determination, as rarely is only one party truly at fault. The compen-
sationists find that the fault requirement is waivering, as there are so many
settlements indicating that the plaintiff is taking a discount because the
issue of fault is unclear.3 9
Extreme financial hardship is not a just sanction for a tortfeasor's negli-
gence but is a poor reason for eliminating the fault system, as it can be
avoided. Various types of insurance are available at low premiums to provide
reparation for losses regardless of fault. Most companies offer to pay medical
expenses from an automobile accident, regardless of fault, up to a limit,
typically, of two thousand dollars.40
36 Report on file in the DePaul Law Review offices.
37 KEETON & O'CONNELL, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile
Claims System, 78 HAuv. L. REV. 329 (1964).
38 Supra note 16.
39 Supra note 3.
40 U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 2, 1967, at 50.
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CONCLUSION
Professors Keeton and O'Connell have pointed out many defects in the
tort liability system as applied to automobile accidents but they have proposed
a system which is also burdened with defects. The difficulties that have been
experienced with compulsory insurance laws will be experienced with pas-
sage of the proposed legislation. The "basic protection" plan also presents
an incentive for unwarranted and inflated claims as well as reducing the in-
centive for careful driving.
In the final analysis, it would be unwise to eliminate a system which has
proven its merit merely because of some deficiencies in favor of the proposed
legislation. Instead, the present system should be modernized to promote
reasonable and speedy settlements.
Edwin Josephson
